I stopped blogging on the subject when I realized that even my friends who blogged on the topic were getting their TSA abuse information from other sources. So, really, no incentive to put in the work if this isn't going to succeed as the one-stop shop for TSA abuse news: I'll stay focused on class action abuse.
I'm happy to turn over the keys to someone else interested in picking up on the issue. Let me know.
For now, two last tidbits: Six-year-old girl groped by TSA.
TSA admits that they punish those who complain by singling them out for additional scrutiny. They justify this abuse by claiming it's just "profiling," though terrorists more typically try to avoid scrutiny. And heaven forfend TSA engage in profiling that is actually meaningful.
I've been through airport security twenty times since my last post, and was able to time my trip through security nineteen of those times to avoid the Rapiscans (either because the Rapiscans were closed, or were not at every line and one could simply stand on the line without the Rapiscan—which makes sense, anyway, because those lines are invariably faster), and opted out the twentieth time. The opt-out grope ended up being more perfunctory than usual because the TSA official was so embarrassed when he accidentally yanked down my unbelted suit pants, which, due to recent weight loss, need the belt to stay up.
Monday, December 27, 2010
Friday, December 24, 2010
The Washington Post demonstrates that the use of intrusive scanners is politics-driven, not security-driven:
Many of the scanner companies are also on pace to spend record amounts of money for lobbying this year on Capitol Hill, where they see potential problems as some lawmakers push for limits on airport-security practices. Top scanner businesses have reported spending more than $6 million on lobbying this year, records show. That doesn't include industrial giants such as General Electric, which also dabbles in scanning technology and has spent more than $32 million on lobbying this year.
The agency has purchased nearly 500 of the cutting-edge scanners - at $200,000 or more each - and plans to buy thousands more, meaning that any restrictions would pose a major threat to the industry's bottom line.
Faced with that threat, the industry made a strong lobbying push over the past two years to help derail any proposed limits, including legislation aimed at restricting or banning the use of full-body scanners by the TSA.
Thursday, December 23, 2010
AOL News via Boing Boing:
For example, the FDA says it doesn't do routine inspections of any nonmedical X-ray unit, including the ones operated by the TSA.
The FDA has not field-tested these scanners and hasn't inspected the manufacturer. It has no legal authority to require owners of these devices -- in this case, TSA -- to provide access for routine testing on these products once they have been sold, FDA press officer said Karen Riley said...
Two-person teams from the Army unit performed surveys of the Advance Image Technology X-ray scanners at just three airports -- in Boston, Los Angeles and Cincinnati, she said. And that was all that the TSA asked the Army to do this year...
"APL's role was to measure radiation coming off the body scanners to verify that it fell within [accepted] standards. We were testing equipment and in no way determined its safety to humans," Helen Worth, head of public affairs for the Johns Hopkins lab, told AOL News.
"Many news articles have said we declared the equipment to be safe, but that was not what we were tasked to do," she added.
An airline pilot is being disciplined by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for posting video on YouTube pointing out what he believes are serious flaws in airport security. ...Six law-enforcement officials showed up at the pilot's house to confiscate his gun.
The YouTube videos, posted Nov. 28, show what the pilot calls the irony of flight crews being forced to go through TSA screening while ground crew who service the aircraft are able to access secure areas simply by swiping a card.
"As you can see, airport security is kind of a farce. It's only smoke and mirrors so you people believe there is actually something going on here," the pilot narrates.
Video shot in the cockpit shows a medieval-looking rescue ax available on the flight deck after the pilots have gone through the metal detectors. "This looks a little more formidable than a box cutter, doesn't it?" the pilot asks rhetorically.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
One of the most foolish DHS initiatives was the much-satirized color-coded alert of five colors. "Red alert" meant that there was a terrorist attack in progress, so was not of any informational significance: we'd be in front of our televisions rather than relying on the DHS website if this happened. "Blue" and "green" meant all clear, and thus was never going to be used: who wants to be held responsible if there's a terrorist attack when you've given the green alert? So we really had a two-color system, yellow and orange. And then, sometime in the Bush administration, someone upgraded us from yellow to orange alert, and we never went back down. So it literally conveyed no information whatsoever. The system has finally been dropped.
Monday, December 13, 2010
Chris Bray writes us:
Love the TSA Abuse blog. Quick note on a personal experience: I went through a
TSA checkpoint at Boston Logan over the weekend, and saw the big blue
Rape-i-scan box at the checkpoint. I gritted my teeth, prepared to opt out and
be groped...and then got far enough toward the front to see that there were four
lanes, but only one with a Rape-i-scan. I just chose a line without the thing,
without any of the slackfaced TSA employees saying anything or looking like they
noticed, and sailed through a sullen and desultory screening. Meanwhile, people
who were dumb enough to *choose* the line with the x-ray box were raising their
hands in submission posture for their naked radiation experience, and getting
their free "anomaly" pat-downs. They looked miserable; I was on my way to my
I'm making too much out of a single experience, but it seems to me that we're
headed for a dynamic in which there are two TSAs: one for the people who choose
to submit to anything without limit, and one for the people who are willing to
make even the slightest effort to push back.
In any event, I can't imagine why anyone would *choose* the line with the
Rape-i-scan. But I think airports should have signs: "DEAR JIHADISTS: PLEASE
SELECT THE LINE WITH THE BACKSCATTER X-RAY MACHINE, SO WE CAN SEE YOUR BOMB."
They're simultaneously abusive and useless, which is really quite an
The main criticism is that many of the security measures adopted since September 11, 2001 have been more for show than for effectiveness. An increasing number of potential passengers are no longer flying because of these new methods, which have, so far, not caught a single terrorist. This is described as a sign of how effective the new measures are. But the new techniques would not have detected the "underwear bomber" of last Christmas, who secreted explosives in his underwear. Moreover, there have been many cases where passengers got weapons past security, usually by accident. ...
Another issue is the small number of terrorist groups actually capable of planning and carrying out an attempt to bomb an airliner. So far, attempts are being caught at the planning stage, which is largely a matter of intelligence and police work. But politicians get little praise for intel efforts, while airport security is very visible. The biggest problem is that airline security is more of a political than security issue. The U.S. is willing to cut intelligence agencies in order to provide more "security theater" for passenger screening. For a politician, it's better for their careers, even if it puts the passengers at more risk.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Jerome Corsi reports about a peer-reviewed study:
Sunday update: Boing Boing has a link to the full paper itself.
A new peer-reviewed scientific study says the backscatter full-body imaging X-ray machines being used by the federal Transportation Security Administration could be fooled by terrorists who simply would mold explosives to conform to their bodies.
WND obtained an advance copy of the report, titled "An evaluation of airport X-ray backscatter units based on image characteristics," in which University of California scientists Leon Kaufman and Joseph Carlson demonstrated that packages of explosives contoured to the body or worn along the sides likely would not be detected by TSA X-ray units built to "see" hard edges and anatomical features, and used primarily to image the front and back of the body.
Sunday update: Boing Boing has a link to the full paper itself.